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Abstract 
 
The coming years will see emerging economies like China, Brazil, India, South Africa as main potential holders for 
the global economic development along with similar pace development in Russia, Saharan Africa and Middle-East. 
This transformation will be experienced with changes in corporate, investment capacity, financial systems in each of 
the economies along with changes in the currency values and foreign reserves. The world order is already witnessing 
change in the currency capacity with ongoing ‘Dollar crisis – Yuan gains’. This is a strong indicator of the potentials 
of multicurrency system led by the new players and falling predominance of US Dollar as international currency. The 
World Bank predicts of either – status quo or a new multicurrency order, and this may be just the right time to be able 
to observe the changes and be able to see future avenues. The study reads the different time zones viz from Great 
Depression to World War II to current Recession in selected economies and the nature of effect on global currency 
orders & practices. The aim of the study is to contribute to the possibilities of multicurrency global economy. The 
study also underlines the complexities of multicurrency system in relation to SDR as established by the IMF and the 
challenges that the emerging economies may have to address to relating to the internationalization of the currencies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The recent change in the global economy and the world order has witnessed rise of emerging market 
economies. The World Bank estimates that, by year 2025 growing economies – India, Brazil, China, 
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Indonesia and Russian Federation – will be major contributors to the global growth like the contemporary 
advanced economies (World Bank Report, 2011). The new levels of engagements, improved domestic 
policies and cross border investments have helped the emerging economies to play prominent role. It is 
believed that the three-fourths of the official foreign exchange reserves are currently with the emerging 
economic powers and such capital is important for international investment which makes the emerging 
economic powers key players in the financial market. In other words, a diffuse distribution of power and 
thus shift towards multi-polarity. In the International politics the focus is on multi-no-polarity, meaning 
more than dominant growth poles and this has been key feature of the ‘global’ system. But at no time in 
history, have, so many developing economies been at the forefront of a multi-polar economic system.   
Established in 1944, the adoption of Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates, US Dollar 
officially anchored world’s currency and ever since, for over years now, has been most important 
currency, though there has been some decline in its role since 1990s (Stephey M.J 2008). As an effort to 
fund the postwar reconstruction, the 44 Member States to the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 
proposed the Bretton Woods System and agreed to fix their exchange rates by typing their currencies to 
the US Dollar. America assured that its currency was dependable by linking US Dollar to gold. The 
System, however, dissolved in August 1971, when then US President Richard Nixon announced 
suspension of US Dollar’s convertibility into gold, which lead to the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
System. Since collapse of the System, countries are free to choose any form of exchange arrangements, 
free float of currency, adopting currency of another country, participating in country bloc (Bordo and 
Eichengreen, 1993). Big issues are on table, ranging from capital account convertibility and a choice of 
exchange rate regime in major emerging economies. As the world order moves towards more multi-polar 
currency system, it may be interesting to focus on how and why currencies other than US Dollar may 
become international reserve, invoicing, payment and, intervention currencies in the decades ahead. With 
time, now, US Dollar faces serious competition from Euro and Yuan or renminbi. Interestingly, as Euro 
remains strong and the gigantic systematic growth of China continues, it is possible that by 2025 the most 
probable global currency scenario may be a multi-polar though one-centered around Dollar, Euro and 
Renminbi, and these regions may constitute major poles to stimulate other countries’ growth through 
trade, finance and technology channels and thereby creating international demand for their currencies 
(Crockett and Goldstein, 1987). With the rapid growth, the emerging-markets have tapped international 
market access through syndicated loans, bond issuances and equity listings. For instance, growing number 
of emerging-markets undertakes at least one cross-border acquisition within two years of accessing the 
market and such bond issuance, by borrowers based in emerging-economies, become the main source of 
capital inflows, which, in next decade and beyond, is likely to provide scope for further expansion of their 
access at more favorable terms (Goldberg, 2010). Markets like Brazil, India, China, and Mexico have 
showcased capacity to fund their growth through such balance mix of local and international markets 
issuance through more mature policies and growth in recent years. 
 
2. Research methodology 
 
The study is based on a comprehensive analysis and observation of the secondary sources of research. 
As the discussion is based on ever changing policy and relating to the Currency of the economies, sample 
based study becomes a challenge. However, there has been enormous emphasis on official documents and 
research outputs of World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The study understands the complex 
nature of currency and its regulations, flow and usage in international financial market on basis of various 
responses of different currencies at different times and during various national and international time 
periods. Also, there is special emphasis on discussions for currency responses at the recent financial crises 
and for the same, the study refers to various journals and eminent scholarly works and official documents 
of discussed emerging economies. The nature and scope of the study is not limited to any particular 
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hypothesis alone, and therefore the ambit of the output, though not a very empirical, becomes even more 
significant, as it provides inputs on the possible ‘policy’ by the world economy and the possibilities, 
based upon.  
3. Discussion  
The recent changes in International Financial Market are paving way for a world economy with an 
increasingly multipolar diffuse character and without any single dominating global economic scenario. 
Over the past two decades, the world has witnessed emerging economies rise to become a powerful force 
in international production, trade and finance. Emerging and developing countries’ share of int’l trade 
flows has risen steadily, from 26 per cent in 1995 to an estimated 42 per cent in 2010. Similarly, more 
than one-third of FDI on developing countries currently originates in other developing countries. 
Emerging economies now hold three-quarters of all official foreign exchange reserves, and sovereign 
wealth funds and other pools of capital in developing countries have become key sources of int’l 
investment. This broad evolution under way in the global economy is not without precedent. In the 
history, paradigms of economic power have drawn and redrawn according to rise and fall of states. In the 
first half of millennium, China and India were world’s predominant growth poles. The industrial 
revolution brought Western Europe economies in forefront and the post-WWII ear, the US became the 
predominant force in global economies, along with Germany and Japan also playing leading roles. In 
more recent years, the global economy has become more dispersed. The increasing diffuse global growth 
and economic power is giving rise to a more collective management addressing the challenges of 
multipolar world economy. In the postwar time, the global economic was based on economic and security 
arrangements between US and its allies with developing economies playing a peripheral role. This 
arrangement still exists, however there have been hints of its erosion. Since the East Asian financial crisis 
of 1997-98, developing countries have increasingly floated their currencies. Also, the integration of 
European nations has made strong representation of Euro has increased in int’l transaction and foreign 
exchange reserve holdings. 
Although many high-income nations may gradually recover from the financial crisis, yet coming 
decades will see global economic growth increasingly generated in emerging economies. China, India and 
Latin America, Sub-Saharan region experienced stronger emergence. This changing role of emerging 
economies will come with major transformation to their economies, corporate sectors, and financial 
systems. The emerging economies will emerge by an average of 4.7 per cent per year which is more than 
twice the developed world’s 2.3 per cent rate, between 2011 and 2025. By 2025, major emerging 
economies like China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and Russia will collectively amount for more than 
half of all global growth. The study realizes that the development of the emerging economies however 
shall largely be dependent on the ability of sustainable improvements in technological dynamism, 
technological reallocation, and improvements in institutional governance, to say a few. Increase in 
innovation and innovative capacity, investments in human capitals and stimulation in research and 
development (R&D) shall also be significant for a long-run stable fast-paced growth. Both China and 
India, for instance, have invested heavily in R&D with 1.4 and 0.8 per cent of the share of GDP 
respectively. The growth of emerging economies will also need to be accompanied by a realignment of 
growth away from external sources and toward internal demand. The global trade is to expand its share in 
global output from 49.4 per cent to 53.6 per cent by 2025, and at the same time the economies are likely 
to experience significant increases in int’l trade. These patterns of growth suggest rising net asset int’l 
position and larger share of major emerging economies in int’l trade in times ahead. The global wealth 
asset holding may shift as well toward emerging economies with surpluses, such as China and major oil 
producers in Middle-East. This may be reflected in ongoing finical scene: Int’l reserves held by emerging 
economies topped US$7.4 trillion in 2010 which is approx. three times the $2.1 trillion reserves held by 
the advances economies. 
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The rapid growth in the emerging economies has led to enormous wealth creation and accumulation of 
assets which has raised the profiles of the emerging economies in the int’l financial market. Even though 
the role of the emerging economies may be growing largely in int’l market, yet there is great disparity 
between their economic size and role of their currencies in the market. At present, no emerging economy 
has a currency that is used internationally. The US Dollar which though has seen slow decline since 
1990s still remains to be the chief int’l currency. However US Dollar now faces challenges from other 
potential currencies, like Euro whose status is expanding, provided, after the recent developments in 
economic crises, Euro may have to overcome the sovereign debt crisis. The emerging economies 
participate actively in cross-border trade and finance, and so such emerging economies – particularly 
Chinese Yuan (or renminbi) – will play lager role. China is an apt example to understand the gap that 
exists in the present time between the economic growth and actual position in int’l financial market. On 
one hand, China is the world’s largest exporting country and holds the largest stock of foreign exchange 
reserves ($2.9 trillion at the end of 2010), on the other hand, China faces massive currency mismatch 
because the transactions by the government, corporations and other entities with the rest of the world are 
dominated by US dollars. The Chinese leadership has taken some important measures in recent times to 
undertake internationalization of renminbi at two fronts a) developing an offshore renminbi market, and 
b) encouraging the use of the renminbi in trade invoicing and settlement.  
The study provides for three potential scenarios: status quo cantered US Dollar as int’l currency, a 
system of Special Drawing Right as the main int’l currency and a multicurrency system. The study finds 
the multicurrency system as the most possible scenario of the three, with end of US Dollar dominance by 
2025, by strong currencies like Euro and renminbi. This change will raise many important questions as 
well. First, as to how will the developing countries be affected by the move. Second, relating to the 
concerns of regulation under the present institutional management. Third, as to what all can be proposed 
to ensure affirmative functioning of the multicurrency system.  
 
3.1. Evolution of Int’l Currency System – historical note 
 
Since 1717, when Sir Isaac Newton was the Master of the Mint, Britain defined its currency primarily 
in terms of gold. During 1870s Germany joined Britain which increased gold prices. By the end of 1870s, 
the entire world was practically on gold standards. The countries which had long tried to keep, both gold 
and silver coins legal tender, found their gold reserves failing when the Americans increased silver 
mining and people began buying cheap silver on the world market and exchange it for currency and then 
bring the currency into the Treasury for gold. The exchange rate was stable under the Pre-WWI gold 
standard. This not only did expand trade, but, also became favourite commonplace for investments by 
riches from North America and Western Europe. With increased capital formation in the large economies 
like France and England, they began overseas investments. The British, however, did not do very well. 
The year 1914 saw close to 40 per cent’s of British capital investments overseas which earned them low 
returns ranging as low as perhaps 2 per cent per year. British currency reserve was under challenge by the 
Americans as they (British) were not as capital intensive like latter. However, failed British attempt in 
overseas investments turned out to be favourable for capital importing economies like US, Canada, 
Australia and others like India and Argentina as the large amount of British financed capital was used to 
speed development of industry and infrastructure. 
This was followed by Gold Standard. The British Parliament repealed long-standing restrictions on the 
export of gold coins from Britain. Later in 19th century, Germany, Japan and Switzerland also adopted 
the gold standard, with US joining the same in year 1879. The major economies adopted the gold 
standards which furthered the exchange of their own respective currencies and thus, they became the first 
few currencies which could be used for international transactions and businesses. Under the gold 
standard, the primary responsibility of the central banks was to preserve the parity between its currency 
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and gold, and to maintain the peace they required adequate gold reserve. Though, the system failed as 
well on a non consensus of the countries. 
 
4. Changing growth and financial world conditions  
 
The global economy of 2025 will look considerably different from 2011. The emerging economies’ 
share in global output has increased from 30 per cent in 2004, to 37 per cent in 2010 to current of 45 per 
cent. These countries will account for about as great volume of int’l trade and investment flows as 
developed world. Shifts in global economic power are not new. The historical trajectory provided 
different phases where the global growth has been driven by a small set of countries. The start of China’s 
Tang Dynasty to the Ming Dynasty (600-1600), China was a dominant force in the global economy (IMF 
Working Paper). The renaissance saw the beginning of the rise of economies in Western Europe – Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, and with advent of industrial revolution Belgium, France, and the Great Britain. In the 
post WWII period, American innovation along with strong demand propelled US to the position of the 
world’s foremost economic power, with Germany, Japan and the former Soviet Union playing leading 
roles as well (Thorsten and Levine, 2005). After years, when the world exist the 2008-09 financial crisis, 
the global economy appears poised to the transition to a new set of growth poles, again.            
The term, ‘growth poles’, was first introduced by François Perroux in 1949. Initially the expression 
was used in reference to agglomerations of firms or industries in which growth was concentrated. Since 
then, the term has been applied to an increasingly varied set of related concepts, with ‘growth pole’ 
quickly taking on a spatial or geographic dimension (Dooley, David and Garber, 2009). These concepts 
differ mainly in terms of the space in which poles are identified. In discussions of regional development 
policy, for example, cities where economic growth is concentrated came to be known as growth poles, 
with the aspects of vertical linkages and external economies of scale remaining central to the concept. In 
establishing this definition for identifying global growth poles, countries are the natural units to be 
considered. Taken this criteria, ‘growth poles’ for this study may refer to the group of countries (or 
emerging economies), for instance, the Euro zone, China and its SAR region of Hong Kong and Macao.  
The time seems to be suggesting sluggish growth of the advanced economies –a phenomenon that has 
been describes as a ‘new normal’– developing economies have recovered from the crisis and are 
exhibiting robust of growth with economies like China, India likely to be influencing global growth in the 
first quarter of the 21st century. This chapter explores the economic and financial implications of this 
shift in detail. The main messages of the Chapter may be as follows: 
Provided the same global economic scenario, the emerging economies will become increasingly 
important engines of global growth during years 2011-2025. The combined output of the six major 
economies – Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, Indonesia, China and Korea (the BRIICKs) – will 
match that of euro area by 2025.  
The changing growth drivers in the world economy point towards a distribution of economic size and 
growth that is more diffuse. US, China and Euro area have been the world’s main growth in 2004-08. By 
2025, emerging economies are likely to join the growth poles in world’s growth activity. However, to 
ensure the same, the emerging economies will have to undertake structural changes are able to provide 
self-sustaining, internally driven growth results.  
As a group of growth pole, the emerging economies are having ever-greater impact on the global 
investment, trade flows and external imbalances. The world economy is already experiencing tangible 
shift in global trade and investments. The emergence and development of new poles: Postcrisis era. 
Many developing economies were beginning to display their economic vitality and dynamism, while 
the advances economies struggled with global financial crisis of 2008-09. The BRIIC nations began to 
challenge the economic power of the G-7 and financial crisis simply accelerated the same (Puga and 
Daniel, 2010). The emerging economies will continue to expand considerably faster than their high-
income counterparts. India and China are likely to be main flag bearers in times ahead, and especially 
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China, which already seem to have taken over Japan as the world’s second largest economy in 2010. As a 
strong growth pole BRICs will increasingly become the world’s major consumer, investors and exporters, 
affecting both the developed and LDCs, with which they interact (Felsenthal and Moshe, 1998). A 
number of economic transmission channels are supported by theory and empirical evidence.  These 
channels include floes of knowledge through trade, finance, and migration, as well as more direct 
transfers of technology (Romer, 1986). For example, FDI from US to China may lead to indirect 
technology transfer via the building US-designed manufacturing plants and equipments. Trade is another 
major channel by which growth is propagated from growth to periphery economies. The more is the 
commercial exchange, the more industrial and technological knowledge the domestic firms acquire; 
hence, the evolution of technological progress and comparative advantage are interlinked and joined 
determined (Grossman and Elhanan, 1991) Capital flows, particularly FDI, have the potential to be an 
important channel of technological diffusion. FDI flows from multinational parent companies to subsides 
and have the potential to directly transfer technological knowledge, or at least result in indirect 
knowledge transfers from subsidiaries to the other firms in the host country through labor turnover or 
technology embedded in the intermediate goods (Du, Ann and Gary, 2011; Ethier 1986). Financial 
openness can promote growth, especially when such liberalization is combines with complementary 
institutional reform, which spurs domestic financial market development and fosters growth (Thorsten 
and Levine, 2005; Quinn and Toyoda 2008). Thus capital flows, indeed, can be another important channel 
through which growth poles drive global growth.        
 
5. International finance and multipolarity    
 
The evolution of int’l monetary system is crucial for the development policy and practice, which has 
direct impact on the developing countries’ access to int’l capital ad the stability of their currencies. Many 
limitations and structural weaknesses have been exposed during the 2008-09 financial crises, and 
therefore the big issue on the table range from capital account convertibility and a choice of exchange rate 
regime in major emerging-market economies to methods of governance of the int’l monetary system. The 
core of the issue, however, is as to whether the current int’l monetary system will remain intact with the 
periodic tweaking, or whether it will fundamentally be overhauled to accommodate the new realities of 
multiple growth poles, the growing role of transnational actors, and the increasing assertiveness by 
leading emerging economies on the global stage. The study believes that the second decade of the 21st 
century unfolds three fundamental considerations for emerging as central to debate on the future shape of 
the int’l monetary system: first, the system’s capacity to accommodate growing economic power and 
active participation of leading emerging economies; second, the system’s embodiment of the necessary 
institutional mechanism to advance international cooperation, while reducing the risks of the 
protectionism, currency wars and political conflict; and third, distributional equity in promoting the 
particular developmental needs and objectives of low-income developing countries (Lin and Dailami , 
2010). The Chapter focuses on how and why currencies other than the US dollar may become int’l 
reserve, invoicing, payment and intervention currencies in the decades ahead. At, present, the euro is 
growing source of int’l competition to the US dollar, and China’s renminbi as another. The main 
messages the chapter analysis is as follows: 
A) In times ahead, the most likely scenario is a multicurrency system centered around the US dollar, 
the euro and the renminbi. The dollar may lose its position as an unquestioned principal int’l currency by 
2025, making way for an expanded int’l role for the euro and a burgeoning int’l role for the renminbi. 
Thus, US, EU and China will constitute the three major growth poles by 2025. This scenario depends on 
how well do China and EU implement financial and structural reforms and manages the fiscal and 
monetary policies in a way consistent with the int’l status of their currencies. An int’l monetary regime 
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anchored to three national currencies will offer greater stability than the present ‘single currency’ system, 
and will also diversify the source of foreign exchange reserve supply which will help the reserve to be 
less prone to risks of deprecation by any one of the reserve currencies. The multicurrency regime would 
also have the potential to command greater legitimacy in matters of seigniorage income, lower costs of 
int’l borrowings, macroeconomic autonomy, and the privilege of running current account deficits with 
limited restraint, are potent. Estimates of seignorage income for US arising from the friend residents’ 
holdings of dollar notes alone have averaged around $15 billion per year since the early 1990s; the 
corresponding estimate for the euro area is $4 billion per year since 2002. In 2010 the US is estimated to 
have benefited from a discount in its borrowing costs of $80 billion as a result of dollar’s int’l status 
(Gabriela, 2011). 
B) The two forces are affecting the int’l monetary cooperation. On one hand, the contemporary 
political system has broadened the scope for the monetary cooperations across borders, and on the other 
hand, the increasingly diffuse global distribution of economic power associated with multipolarity will 
render monetary cooperation more difficult. The prospect of the successful int’l policy coordination in a 
multipolar world economic order, then, rests on the argument that economic interdependence has 
deepened with globalization, requiring strengthening of policy linkages. After the 2008-09 financial 
crisis, the advanced economies are required to accept that their policies have spillover effect over other 
economies. The countries should welcome the monetary policies which profess collaboration among 
central banks to achieve financial stability and sustainable growth liquidity. 
C) The developing countries will continue, most of all the poorest countries will continue to use the 
foreign currencies to carry out transactions with the rest of the world and will remain exposed to 
exchange rate fluctuations in a multicurrency int’l monetary system. Alliance with one of the leading-
currency countries will reduce the risk for the developing countries. In the best case scenario, the 
multicurrency will put into place mechanism for limiting currency volatility through increased central 
bank coordination and the certain of instruments that facilitate the central bank coordination and 
development of private markets for a special drawing rights (SDRs) (Adam, 2008). 
There are diverse implications of the ongoing changes in the dynamics of the global growth and 
wealth for the future course of the international monetary and financial arrangements. Although there are 
many, but these hurdles there is a need to overcome them for a currency to gain int’l status. 
 
5.1. International Currency Usage and Importance 
 
Any national currency may serve as international currency when its demand goes beyond its own 
territory, and in turn, is related to its ability to satisfy its role as international money with low transaction 
costs, while maintaining confidence. A key feature, therefore may be, that the more the currency is used, 
the lower the transaction costs (Philipp, 1998). The supply of the int’l currencies is influenced by the 
actions of the governments to allow int’l use and to provide the institutional and policy underpinnings that 
encourage the development of financial markets and produce macroeconomic stability (George, 1991). 
Without access to such financial market, where the currency can be used instrumentally in investments, 
the currency’s international usefulness in limited. Conversely, the attempts to stimulate the currency will 
remain unsuccessful without demand. An int’l currency uses the parallels of the domestic functions, for 
instance, serving a means of payments, in invoicing of trade, to anchor the exchange rate of currencies 
pledged, cross-border payments and to demonstrate int’l assets and liabilities (Benjamin, 1998; Peter, 
1983). The int’l currency can serve as a ‘vehicle currency’ for trading between the pairs of currencies for 
which the liquidity of the bilateral market is limited.  
Several factors affect the likelihood to be int’l currency. In general, int’l currencies are issued by 
countries that have (1) low and stable inflation; (2) open, deep and broad financial markets; and (3) a 
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large share in world trade (Joseph and Bruce, 2010). However from an individual’s point of view, the 
attractiveness in any currency depends on both, its ability to retain its value in terms of other currencies 
and its purchasing power. Economic size also plays a significant role which gives any country market 
power and allows that country to dominate its trade and in its own currency, forcing foreigners to absorb 
the impact of currency fluctuations; second, a large economy typically enhances the breadth and depth of 
domestic financial markets. 
At present US Dollar remains the world’s dominant currency, however, ever since 2000, the Euro has 
taken on growing role in different international finance settings and has increased proportion of world’s 
foreign exchange reserves, and serves frequently as a vehicle currency for foreign exchange transition. 
Despite growing importance of the Euro as currency the share of US Dollars remains well more than 
double. The foreign exchange market reserves, for instance, is still more than double than the amount of 
turnover in Euro. However, the share of the market in dollars has declined, from 45 per cent in 2001 to 42 
per cent in 2010. Also, other than Euro, only three currencies: the Yen, the Pound Sterling, and the Swiss 
Franc have been successful in playing role of international currencies, though in very small share. Among 
them, the usage of Yen has shown rapid decline owning to the slow Japanese growth. The Pound Sterling 
and Swiss Franc, on the other hand rose slightly over the same period (Daniel, 2010). 
 
6. Towards multicurrency system  
 
US dollar remains the preeminent int’l national currency for several reasons: the size of the US 
economy, the global influence of US monetary policy, the breadth and depth of US financial markets, and 
the fact the important commodities like the Oil are prices in US dollars. Over the period of time, the ease 
and security involved with the investing in US dollars has led the rest of the world to take on massive 
levels of financial exposure to the US market (World Bank, 2006). The ability to issue a currency that’s 
used internationally confers obvious benefits to the issuing country and US has always had such benefits. 
A close observation of the US revenue benefits provides that US has had enormous seignniorage revenue 
of roughly $90 billion per year (since 2007), and approx $20 billion for the euro area. Over the years, ease 
and security to trade and invest in US dollar has led to rest of the world to take on massive levels of 
financial exposure to US. The monetary policies, therefore, have direct effect on foreign economies, 
investors and residents. The 2008-09 finacial crisis narrowed US trade deficit to a estimate of $480 billion 
in 2010. But even the crisis, which originated in the US, didn’t set off the dollar; to the contrary, the crisis 
resulted in extreme demand for the dollar dominated assets (Takatoshi, Satoshi, Kiyotaka and Junko, 
2010). At this time, it becomes extremely interesting to observe the response of the euro and renminbi 
towards dollar. In years to come rapid economic expansion of China, where the pace of growth has 
exceeded that of US and the euro area, increases the likelihood that the renminbi will compete with the 
US dollar as a reserve currency (McCauley, 2011). 
 
6.1Avenues of higher standards of Internationalization of Euro 
 
The Euro, in 11 years of its creation, has become serious competitor of US Dollar. With the creation of 
all-Euro zones, the emerging economies such as Brazil, China, Mexico, and Turkey have been able to 
foresee an alternative. There is high growth of Euro-dominated fixed income markets in size, depth and 
product range, and is still expanding, with outstanding bonds and notes issues amounting to $11.1 trillion, 
or 45 per cent of the global total, compared to $10.2 trillion for US Dollar. However due to high 
sovereign debts, there is need for greater coordination of fiscal policy. Though EU seems to be taking 
significant steps, such as, intervention in the secondary markets through European Central Bank and 
providing temporary assistance to the countries with budgetary need and support the financial stability. 
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Although the bailouts seems to be a policy contrary to statutory practice of ECB, yet the negotiations 
between EU and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) (Delimatsis, 2011) has been able to craft, 
within the capacity, issuance of the bonds to the countries in times of difficulty. The ongoing process of 
overall European integration, however eventually may lead to reforms that reduce moral hazard and 
enhance the attractiveness of Euro with respect to US Dollar.  
 
6.2. Internationalization of the renminbi    
 
The international role of renminbi is poised to grow in future from modest base to prospective 
internationally recognized exchange currency. This, however largely depends on the Chinese authorities, 
who have been perusing aggressive policy shifts promoting development of local markets and how 
quickly currency convertibility is implemented. In many aspects, China already satisfies the underlying 
criteria required for its currency to take international role. Interestingly, the economists have been able to 
draw lines between growth of renminbi with US Dollar and stating that China’s current position in global 
manufacturing exports is similar to that of US in the interwar period (ZhangJie, 2011). On other criterion 
– open, deep and board financial market – renminbi still has a long way to go. Restrictions on 
convertibility also reduce the attractiveness of renminbi. The recent developments and initiatives by 
Chinese Leadership have been constructive for internationalization of renminbi which may be a) 
development of an offshore renminbi market and b) encouraging the use of renminbi in trade invoicing 
and settlement. The actions undertaken, so far, have been felt in the regional sense, with promotion of 
renminbi in cross-border trade between China and its neighbors in South-East Asia. Also, China looks 
forward for arrangements to include all countries (Hong Kong SAR & Macau SAR) and 20 provinces 
inside People Republic of China to be able to business in renminbi. Several international finance 
institution (Asian Development Bank, International Finance Corporation and others) have decided for 
lifting of restrictions on renminbi and direct issuance of renminbi dominated bonds, which as on January 
2011 have been Y 14 billion (about $2 billion) (Hui and Wai, 2010). In short, the strongest motivation for 
internationalization of the renminbi is not just related to the impact it would make in developing local 
market, but also mitigation of the tremendous currency mismatch in its asset/liability provisions vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world.          
 
7. A path towards improved institutional management of multicurrency world   
 
In light of expanding the multipolarity in the world, there is need for economic policy coordination and 
stronger national improved policies with int’l understandings. The G-20 is actively been pursuing a 
framework of indicative guidelines for indentifying imbalances that need to be addressed by policy 
measures (Goldberg, 2010). G-20 also needs to institutionalize coordination, drawing on the in-house 
expertise. It seems that ad-hoc coordination and substantial agreements, like Plaza Agreement, 1985, or 
the Bonn Summit, 1978, have not been sufficient in preventing excesses such as uncontrolled global 
expansion of liquidity and global imbalances. Atleast three types of policy rules have to be proposed to 
lessen the negative spillovers on other countries: rules on allowable exchange rate behavior; limits on 
balances of payments positions; and criteria for proscribing beggar-they-neighbor macroeconomic 
policies. If countries are concerned, each of them will ensure resistance of exchange rate appreciation. 
The challenge for the policy solution is, therefore, to find evenhanded criteria for choosing the 
appropriate values for the three variables listed above. At present, there seems to be political will and also 
mechanism within G-20 nation to address any such issue. G-20’s attempt to exert peer pressure on its 
members’ policies defines the contemporary approach towards int’l policy coordination. Policy based 
solution can be attained if the coordination is focused on goals that have the potential to benefit many 
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countries in the same way: sustainable growth, financial stability, low inflation, and exchange rate 
stability.  
 
 7.1. Effect on the Developing Countries            
 
As observed before, the less developed economies will continue o transact internationally in 
currencies other than their own, and thus would be exposes to the exchange rate risks. Developing 
countries with floating exchange rates regimes may experience heightened foreign exchange volatility, 
especially if the exchange rate movements among the leading currency economies are uncoordinated. 
Furthermore, a move by number of developing economies towards a non-dollar-pegging regime could 
also have implications for the system as a whole and such issues would require further study. 
 
7.3. Role of SDR and Developing Economies 
 
Over the years, there have been numerous proposals to stimulate the attractiveness of SDR. The 
proposal by BRICs in 2008, for example revised the idea of making the SDR an important reserve 
currency by encouraging its use by the private ad official SDRs and allowing central bans to transact in 
SDRs with private holders. To issue marketable debt in SDRs is yet another option for the governments, 
which would enhance market liquidity for the SDRs in the process. So far, no concrete actions have been 
taken, however, IMF has been involved in reviewing the composition of SDR and the rules governing its 
use. Though it may not be foreseeable to make SDR the primary reserve asset of the int’l monetary 
system, greater focus on the alternatives to national currencies gradually may create preconditions for 
greater management of the monetary system, with advances of systematic stability along the way.       
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The world economy is under transformative change and growing dynamism in financial affairs. The 
int’l monetary system and conditions become significant for the future matters of the world economy, 
with that of developing economies, in particular. Many of the structural weaknesses have already been 
exposed in 2008-09 financial crisis and has professed the idea for the need of reform and improvement. 
The wide disparities between the emerging economies and advanced economies needs urgent attention, in 
which IMF and World Bank can play a very significant role. Though there seems to be greater attention to 
the emerging economies, however, none of their currencies is in the use at present. But the situations may 
change in coming decades, but the shift will be limited by the inertia in currency usage. Recent moves by 
the Chinese authorities, for example, to encourage int’l use of the renminbi can be expected to gradually 
increase use of renminbi as currency in East Asia. However, the future international role of the renminbi 
will depend importantly on whether such changes lead to affirmative changes and development of a 
regional currency. Emerging-market economies other than China will need to evaluate whether 
internationalization of their currencies would impose constraints on monetary policies, open up new 
sources of financing, and reduce exchange rate risk. In the meantime, it is the euro, rather than any other 
currency, that’s has promising potential to rival the US dollar as a true int’l currency. For the same, EU 
has to undertake serious steps to overcome the financial crisis in Euro zone, as Euro holds the condition to 
overtake dollar much before renminbi would. With such factors in mind, three possible int’l currencies 
scenarios for the period 2011-2025 emerge. In the first scenario, the US dollar’s dominance remains 
without a serious challenge; second, a more multipolar int’l monetary system with dollar, euro and 
renminbi as most likely int’l currencies; third, dissatisfaction with the in’l currencies may lead to reforms 
that make supply of the world’s currency the result of multilateral decisions – a role intended for the SDR 
when it was created.             
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